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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, i 
Plaintiff/Appellee, i 
V» 1 
PATRICK JOHN BRASSELL, i 
Defendant/Appellant, i 
t Case No. 890305-CA 
s Priority Two 
B R I E F O F A P P E L L E E 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of three counts of 
robbery, felonies in the second degree in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-6-301 (Supp. 1986), as a result of a plea to an etmended 
information in the Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, Judge Raymond S. Uno presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1989) and Rule 26(b)(1), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the magistrate abused its discretion in 
continuing defendant's preliminary hearing beyond the 10-day 
statutory period even though there was good cause, as the rule 
allows, to continue the hearing. 
2. Whether defendant's conditional plea reserved only 
the right to appeal a violation of Rule 7(7), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (the rule requiring an incarcerated defendant 
to have a preliminary hearing within ten days unless there is 
good cause to extend the time), or whether the agreement was 
adequately specific to allow him to appeal all speedy trial 
issues. Even if this Court allows him to appeal all speedy trial 
issues, defendant has not established that he is entitled to 
relief. 
The standard of review for the question of whether the 
circuit judge erred in scheduling the preliminary hearing more 
than ten days after the date of the initial presentment is an 
abuse of discretion standard. That is, did the court abuse its 
discretion in finding that there was "good cause," as the rule 
allows, to exceed the ten day provision for incarcerated 
defendants. See State v. Bradshaw, 680 P.2d 1036, 1041 (Utah 
1984). 
The question of whether the plea agreement is 
sufficiently precise to allow defendant to appeal issues other 
than the ten day rule for preliminary hearings appears to be a 
question of fact based upon the adequacy of the record. See 
State v. Sery# 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(conditional pleas allowed when the agreement is accepted by the 
trial court and specifically preserves an issue for appeal and 
allows withdrawal of the plea if defendant prevails on appeal). 
See Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah Ct. App 
1990), petition for cert, filed, 133 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah 
1990). 
The standard of review for the speedy trial issue (in 
the event this Court reviews it) has not been clearly articulated 
by Utah courts. The Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972)f 
test has been adopted by Utah courts, State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 
1325, 1327-28 (Utah 1986), and requires an appellate court to 
apply, on an ad hoc basis, a balancing test of four factors. The 
standard of review for questions of law is a correction of error 
standard. State v. Wessendorf, 777 P.2d 523 (Utah Ct. App.) 
cert, denied 781 P.2d 878 (1989); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Western Fiberglass v. Kirton, McConkie & 
Bushnell, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 29 (Utah Ct. App. March 2, 
1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
In addition to the provisions quoted throughout this 
brief, the following provisions are provided; 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-301 (Supp. 1986) (now in 1990): 
Robbery. (1) Robbery is the unlawful and 
intentional taking of personal property in 
the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, 
accomplished by means of force or fear. 
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second 
degree. 
Rule 7(7), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
(Proceedings before magistrate.) 
(7) (a) If a defendant is charged with a 
felony, he may not be called on to enter a 
plea before the committing magistrate. 
During the initial appearance before the 
magistrate, the defendant shall be advised of 
his right to a preliminary examination. If 
the defendant waives his right to a 
preliminary examination, and the prosecuting 
attorney consents, the magistrate shall order 
the defendant bound over to answer in the 
district court. 
(b) If the defendant does not waive a 
preliminary examination, the magistrate shall 
schedule the preliminary examination. The 
examination shall be held within a reasonable 
time, but not later than ten days if the 
defendant is in custody for the offense 
charged and not later than 30 days if he is 
not in custody. These time periods may be 
extended by the magistrate for good cause 
shown. A preliminary examination may not be 
held if the defendant is indicted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Patrick John Brassell, pleaded guilty in 
Third District Court to three counts of robbery, second degree 
felonies as contained in Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-301 (Supp. 1986). 
The original information alleged three counts of aggravated 
robbery, first degree felonies in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-6-302 (1978), and that defendant was an habitual criminal in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1978). Defendant 
entered a conditional plea, reserving the right to appeal his 
right to a speedy preliminary hearing, specifically his right 
pursuant to Rule 7(7), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, to have 
a preliminary hearing within ten days of the presentment because 
he was in custody. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March, 19, 1986, two men robbed Western Savings & 
Loan (R. 241 at 6-7). They were observed by three bank tellers 
and one bank customer, none of whom were able to later identify 
the robbers (R. 241 at 23, 39, 47). A customer, Eugene Garrett, 
entered the bank during the robbery, realized what was occurring 
and left the bank without being observed by the robbers (R. 241 
at 49). He went next door and called the police (R. 241 at 49-
50). As the robbers were driving away, he obtained the license 
plate number and description of the get-away car (R. 241 at 50-
52). 
Some of the clothing the men were wearing was located 
soon after the event in the abandoned get-away car, including the 
robbers' stocking caps and jackets (R. 241 at 83-86). The get-
away car also contained a paper sack (R. 241 at 86). Four latent 
prints were located on the sack; an FBI fingerprint expert 
identified the prints as belonging to defendant, Patrick Brassell 
(R. 241 at 96-98). 
Additionally, Brad Hull, one of the residents at a 
boarding house in which Brassell resided at the time of the 
robbery, provided information which linked defendant to the 
crime. Specifically, prior to the robbery, defendant worked at a 
soap factory in exchange for room and board at the boarding house 
(R. 241 at 62). He had no money except for what he obtained from 
robbing "winos" (R. 241 at 64). After the robbery, he purchased 
expensive items like a car and a leather jacket (R. 241 at 63). 
Further, defendant showed Mr. Hull a photograph of the bank 
robbers, taken from the bank video cameras, that was printed in a 
local paper. As defendant showed Hull the photo, he admitted his 
involvement in the robbery (R. 241 at 67-68). 
An information charging defendant and another person 
was issued on May 10, 1988, about two years after the robbery (R. 
6-8). Defendant was extradited from the State of Virginia (see 
R. 239 at 4). He was booked into the Salt Lake County Jail on 
September 9, 1988 (R. 11). Defendant appeared at his initial 
presentment on September 12, 1988 (R. 242 at 2). He identified 
his lawyer as LeRoy Johnson, but stated that he had not contacted 
him yet (R. 242 at 2). The matter was set for calendar call on 
September 20, 1988, before Judge Fuchs (R. 242 at 2). 
On September 20, 1988, defendant appeared before Judge 
Fuchs (R. 243 at 2). His attorney, identified as Loni Deland, 
was not present because he was ill (R. 243 at 2). As a result of 
his attorney's illness, the matter was continued two days until 
September 22, 1988, before Judge Gowans (R. 243 at 2-3). 
On September 22, 1988, defendant appeared with his 
attorney, Loni Deland, before Judge Gowans for calendar call (R. 
244 at 2; the transcript is included in its entirety as Appendix 
A). At this hearing, the prosecutor informed the court that 
prior to the preliminary hearing, it would be mutually beneficial 
for the parties to have a line-up (R. 244 at 2). However, the 
prosecutor stated that one of the four potential identification 
witnesses, Mr. Garrett (the customer who entered the bank, 
observed the robbery in progress, left to call the police, and 
observed the robbers driving away) was working in California and 
could not be reached during the day (R. 244 at 2). Further, 
since he was going to be brought in from California for the 
preliminary hearing, both the line-up and the preliminary hearing 
should be held on the same day (R. 244 at 2-3). Mr. Garrett's 
testimony would be different than the three bank tellers 
testimony, and, until the line-up proceeding, the prosecution 
could not be certain whether any of the witnesses could identify 
the defendant, in part because a photo spread had not been done 
(R. 244 at 5). However, Mr. Garrett felt more strongly than any 
of the bank tellers that he would be able to identify the robbers 
(R. 244 at 6). 
Mr. Deland and Judge Fuchs' clerk apparently had a 
miscommunication, as Mr. Deland thought the preliminary hearing 
was scheduled before Judge Fuchs two days hence, when it was not 
scheduled at all (R. 244 at 2, 6-7). 
When Judge Gowans attempted to schedule the preliminary 
hearing, Mr. Deland indicated he was unavailable for a period of 
time and then was not available until October 6th (R. 244 at 7). 
The court offered to set the hearing on October 4th, but could 
not schedule the hearing prior to that (apparently during the 
week of September 26-30) because the judge was scheduled to 
attend a judicial conference (R. 244 at 7). The preliminary 
hearing was therefore scheduled for October 6, 1988 (R. 244 at 
8). The judge did not schedule a calendar call, as is the usual 
procedure, in an effort to shorten the delay (R. 244 at 8). 
During the September 22 hearing, the court stated that, 
despite the provision of Rule 7(7), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which requires a preliminary to be held within ten 
days for an incarcerated defendant, he could continue the 
proceeding for "good cause" (R. 244 at 6). The court found that 
the unavailability of a witness is good cause to exceed the ten-
day rule (R. 244 at 6). 
The preliminary hearing went forward on October 6, 1988 
(R. 241). Following the hearing, defendant was bound over to the 
district court for trial (R. 241 at 119). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Rule 7(7), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, allows a 
preliminary hearing to be held more than ten days following the 
initial presentment of an incarcerated defendant when there is 
"good cause." In the present case, several factors were present 
to establish good cause to hold the preliminary hearing beyond 
the ten-day period. The short delay did not amount to an 
unconstitutional denial of due process that would entitle 
defendant to a reversal of his conviction and dismissal of the 
charges. 
The record establishes that the conditional plea 
agreement entitles defendant to appeal only the issue set forth 
above. Even if this Court finds the conditional plea agreement 
was sufficiently specific to allow defendant to appeal all 
instances of delay in these proceedings, defendant has not 
established that he is entitled to dismissal of the charges. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS GOOD CAUSE TO EXTEND DEFENDANT'S 
PRELIMINARY HEARING BEYOND THE TEN-DAY PERIOD 
SET FORTH IN RULE 7(7), UTAH RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
Defendant argues that he was denied his statutory right 
to have a preliminary hearing held within ten days. He relies 
primarily upon Rule 7(7), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
states in pertinent part: 
If the defendant does not waive a preliminary 
examination, the magistrate shall schedule 
the preliminary examination. The examination 
shall be held within a reasonable time, but 
not later than ten days if the defendant is 
in custody for the offense charged and not 
later than 30 days if he is not in custody. 
These time periods may be extended by the 
magistrate for good cause shown. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Following defendant's extradition from Virginia, he was 
incarcerated at the Salt Lake County Jail. His initial 
presentment was held on September 12, 1988 (R. 242 at 2). 
Defendant informed the court that his attorney was LeRoy Johnson, 
but that he had not contacted him yet (R 242 at 2). Judge Grant 
set the case for calendar call on September 20 (R. 242 at 2). 
At the first calendar call on September 20, defendant's 
attorney, Loni Deland, was not present because he was ill (R. 243 
at 2). After the hearing, Mr. Deland was apparently informed 
that defendant's preliminary hearing was scheduled for Thursday, 
September 29; however, when Judge Fuchs' clerk was contacted 
during the calendar call on September 22, Mr. Deland was informed 
that the hearing had not been scheduled (R. 244 at 2, 6). 
During the September 22 calendar call, Judge Gowans 
scheduled the preliminary hearing for October 6, 1988, a date two 
weeks beyond the 10-day period established in Rule 7(7), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Judge Gowans stated that he could 
extend the hearing beyond the ten-day period required by Rule 
7(7) if there was good cause (R. 244 at 6). 
There was good cause for the extension in this case. 
First, prior to the preliminary hearing, both parties desired a 
line-up. One of the witnesses, Mr. Garrett, had to come to Utah 
from California for both proceedings (the line-up and the 
preliminary hearing) and it was difficult to contact him. 
Additionally, it was unlikely that the jail could accommodate a 
line-up on such short notice, as the line-up schedule was very 
full. Finally, Judge Gowans was scheduled to attend a judicial 
conference the following week and would, therefore, be 
unavailable. As indicated, defendant's initial presentment was 
September 12. The October 6 preliminary hearing was about two 
weeks beyond the statutory ten-day period. The delay was not 
unreasonable# much less an unconstitutional violation of due 
process. 
The case law on the issue of a speedy preliminary 
hearing makes it clear that defendant's argument is without 
merit. In State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Utah 1985), the 
Utah Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, and 
reiterated that Rule 7(7) allows a preliminary hearing to be held 
beyond the ten-day period if there is good cause shown. In State 
v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 393 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court 
stated: 
[W]e generally assume the validity of the 
actions of the court below . . . . 
Presumably, the continuances [of the 
preliminary hearing] were granted based on 
what the court determined to be good cause 
Defendant cites United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 
(1971), for the proposition that the denial of a speedy 
preliminary hearing may violate the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment if the defendant can demonstrate prejudice 
and prosecutorial intent to gain an advantage. (Appellant's 
Opening Brief at 16). Defendant has demonstrated neither. The 
Court held that the sixth amendment does not apply to pre-
accusation delays and indicated that the thirty-eight month delay 
between the defendants' last criminal act and the indictment did 
not violate the due process clause because the defendants did not 
demonstrate that they had been prejudiced or that the delay was 
the result of the government's attempt to intentionally gain an 
advantage. Marion, 407 U.S. at 313, 325. 
and, in the absence of record evidence to the 
contrary, we cannot 6ay that those 
determinations amounted to abuse of 
discretion. 
(Citations omitted.) In the present case, unlike Kelly, the 
record is clear as to why the court found good cause to continue 
the hearing beyond the ten-day period contained in the rule. 
The Supreme Court has established that a defendant must 
show that he has been prejudiced before an untimely preliminary 
hearing requires a reversal of his conviction. As the Court said 
in Kelly: 
In Poteet, the Court found that in the 
absence of prejudice to the appellant a 
violation of Rule 7(c) [now Rule 7(7)] did 
not warrant reversal. 
. . . . 
[W]e have recently observed that in a case 
where the only possible prejudice to a 
defendant was a brief period of detention 
prior to preliminary hearing, M[i]n light of 
the subsequent conviction, that temporary 
period of possibly wrongful detention is of 
minimal significance and does not warrant a 
reversal of an otherwise valid conviction. 
Id. at 393 (quoting State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 
1985) and citing State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760 (Utah 1984)). 
More recently, the issue was addressed in State v. 
Ossana, 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987). The Supreme Court again cited 
Poteet and stated: 
The [Supreme] Court noted that although 
article I, section 13 of the Utah 
Constitution guarantees an accused the right 
to a preliminary hearing, it does not specify 
a time in which the hearing must be held. 
Rule 7(c) [now Rule 7(7)) does specify a time 
limit, but does not provide a remedy for a 
violation of that time limit. In Poteet, the 
Court found that in the absence of prejudice 
to the accused, a violation of Rule 7(c) did 
not warrant reversal. 
n 
Id. at 632 (footnote omitted). Defendant claims that this 
2 
provision guarantees him the "right to a speedy preliminary 
hearing . . . .M (Appellant's Opening Brief at 17.) Any right 
defendant has to a preliminary hearing within a specific time 
stems only from Rule 7(7). And the ten-day provision can be 
extended upon a determination of good cause. The court in this 
case found good cause to exceed the ten-day provision. Defendant 
has failed to establish that he was prejudiced and, therefore, 
the court abused its discretion. 
In the present case, defendant was in a position to 
benefit from a line-up prior to the preliminary hearing. In 
fact, he did benefit as none of the witnesses was able to 
identify him. The line-up had to be completed prior to the 
preliminary hearing to preclude the witnesses' potential 
identification from being tainted as the result of face-to-face 
confrontation in court. 
Mr. Garrett's presence at the line-up and preliminary 
hearing was indispensable. He was working in California and 
could not be reached during the day because he was not in a 
telephone-accessible location. The prosecutor had to telephone 
Article I, S 13 of the Utah Constitution states: 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted 
by indictment# shall be prosecuted by 
information after examination and commitment 
by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the 
State, or by indictment, with or without such 
examination and commitment. The information 
of the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereof shall be prescribed by the 
Legislature. 
his wife, who would in turn call him late at night. (R. 244 at 2-
3.) 
Neither the prosecution nor the defense knew whether 
Mr. Garrett or the three bank tellers could identify the 
defendant. According to Mr. Deland, the police report indicated 
that Mr. Garrett was "more strong" on identification than the 
others (R. 244 at 6), but none of the witnesses was sure about 
whether they could identify defendant in a line-up. Although the 
bank tellers constituted three potential identification 
witnesses, Mr. Garrett observed the robbery from a different 
perspective and was the only witness who observed the robbers in 
the get-away car and was the only one who obtained the license 
plate number. His observations were, therefore, not 
"cumulative," as defendant claims. Certainly, it was to 
defendant's advantage that it be established before the 
preliminary hearing, when the witnesses would actually see 
defendant in court, whether any of them, including Mr. Garrett, 
could identify him. 
Contrary to defendant's assertions, the September 27th 
preliminary hearing was not "vacated" (Appellant's Opening Brief 
at 15) At the very least, there was a miscommunication between 
defense counsel and Judge Fuchs' clerk. When defense counsel 
telephoned Judge Fuchs' clerk during the September 22 roll call, 
he was informed they did not "know anything" about the September 
27th preliminary hearing (R. 244 at 6). The preliminary hearing 
was not continued three times (Brief at 17); only one preliminary 
hearing was actually scheduled, and it went forward on October 6 
as scheduled. 
Defense counsel was informed that Judge Gowans was 
attending a judicial conference and would not be available on 
September 29 and apparently during that week (R. 244 at 7). 
Judge Gowans offered to hear the matter on October 4; however, 
defense counsel was unavailable (R. 244 at 7). As defendant 
pointed out in his brief, there are fifteen circuit court judges. 
Even though Judge Gowans was unavailable for a period of time due 
to the conference, defendant did not even request that a 
different judge hear the matter in Judge Gowans' absence. 
Further, a judicial conference during which judges receive 
training and information relevant to their positions as judges is 
a good reason to be away from the courtroom, and constitutes 
"good cause" for not holding a preliminary hearing on a date 
defendant desired. 
In the present case, defendant does not allege that he 
has been prejudiced by the delay in the preliminary hearing, 
aside from spending an additional two weeks in jail. While 
undesirable, the incarceration alone is not sufficient prejudice 
to defendant to justify a reversal in this case. Defendant has 
not alleged that a single witness or piece of evidence has 
disappeared or that his witnesses have suffered memory lapses as 
a result of the slight delay. Further, defendant has admitted 
Defendant's reliance on State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 
1986), is irrelevant. Brickey held that a prosecutor cannot 
refile charges once the case is dismissed for lack of evidence, 
unless the State establishes that there is new evidence. Brickey 
did not address a violation of the preliminary hearing "ten-day 
rule" for incarcerated defendants. 
his guilt to three counts of robbery (R. 240 at 10). He has been 
sentenced to one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for 
each count, with two of the sentences to run consecutively (R. 
239 at 10). He has a prior record (R. 239 at 4-5), which reduces 
his chances of an early parole date. Two extra weeks in jail 
prior to the preliminary hearing can only be viewed in this 
context as having little consequence. Because he has shown no 
prejudice and the delay was slight, defendant's claim is without 
merit. He is not entitled to a reversal and dismissal of the 
charges. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S CONDITIONAL PLEA LIMITED HIS 
RIGHT TO APPEAL TO ONE ISSUE: WHETHER HIS 
PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS EXTENDED BEYOND THE 
TEN-DAY PERIOD APPLICABLE TO INCARCERATED 
DEFENDANTS FOR GOOD CAUSE. 
In State v. Seryf 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
and State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), this Court 
recognized the validity of conditional pleas under certain 
circumstances. The general rule is that a voluntary plea of 
guilty is a waiver of the right to appeal all non-jurisdictional 
issues, including pre-plea constitutional violations. Sery, 758 
P.2d at 938; see also State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 
1989). "However, the aforementioned general rule is inapplicable 
where, as here, the plea entered by the defendant with the 
consent of the prosecution and accepted by the trial judge 
specifically preserves the suppression issue for appeal and 
allows withdrawal of the plea if defendant's arguments in favor 
of suppression are accepted by the appellate court." Sery, 758 
P.2d at 938 (emphasis added). In the present case, defendant 
specifically reserved the right to appeal only one issue: 
whether good cause was established to schedule his preliminary 
hearing later than ten days from the date of first appearance. 
He did not specifically preserve any other issues for appeal. 
Further, the record does not establish an agreement between the 
prosecution and defense regarding the remedy even if defendant 
were to be successful on appeal on this issue. 
Because defendant expressly reserved the right to 
appeal only one issue—whether he was denied his right to a 
"speedy" preliminary hearing—and the prosecution agreed to the 
conditional plea only on this issue, he is precluded from raising 
any additional issues. 
Defendant entered his change of plea on March 14, 1989, 
pursuant to an agreement that was made prior to the hearing (R. 
240). Defendant had filed a number of pretrial motions. At the 
beginning of the hearing on March 14, the following colloquy took 
place: 
THE COURT: I have had the opportunity to 
read all of the pleadings that have been 
filed in the cases that have been filed and I 
am prepared to rule at this time. 
I understand that you want to supplement 
this with additional material that may be 
relevant to any appeal that may be taken. 
MR. WALSH [THE PROSECUTOR]: That is correct, 
Judge. There is only one issue that we are 
talking about now that would require a ruling 
from the Court; and that would be with 
respect to the denial of his speedy — I 
guess it's part of the speedy trial motion 
that Mr. Deland filed. It would be with 
respect to the violation of the ten-day rule 
requiring a preliminary hearing to be held 
within ten days of the date that the 
defendant was arraigned. 
That is — isn't that the motion, Loni 
[the defense attorney], that they want to be 
considered on appeal, and that would be part 
of the conditional plea. 
MR. DELAND: It is, your Honor. 
• • • • 
THE COURT: Based on what the Court is aware 
of and what's been filed with the Court, the 
Court is of the opinion that the ten-day rule 
applies to situations where it can be done 
but for good cause showing that it can exceed 
those ten days. 
(R. 240 at 3-5.) 
[Defendant then entered his guilty pleas to 
three counts of robbery. . . .] 
MR. WALSH: I think we can agree and put it 
on the record here, which would obviate the 
necessity of going back to — 
MR. DELAND: There's a rule about proffering 
on evidentiary matters, but I don't have any 
objection on the part of the agreement. We 
can supplement the record here as far as we 
can, but we would also need to obtain 
transcripts of any actual hearings before any 
Circuit Court judges before we go to this 
motion. And it would be my responsibility to 
get those to supplement the record further on 
appeal. 
MR. WALSH: Okay. Can we just have the 
benefit of the record to see what our record 
reflects with respect to that one issue. And 
I might indicate, Judge, for the record, that 
part of our reasoning for entering into this 
negotiation is that, in light of the 
conditional plea, there will be only one 
issue raised on appeal; and that was the 
delay with respect to the preliminary 
hearing. Nothing else; there would be no 
other issue that would be raised on appeal. 
And that's part of our plea bargain here, 
part of the essence of the bargain. 
(R. 240 at 12-13.) 
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The prosecutor and defense counsel then made proffers 
for the record regarding the facts and procedures which took 
place in the circuit court prior to the preliminary hearing. 
These facts related only to the timely preliminary hearing issue 
and not to any facts that would support a speedy trial or 
cumulative delay claim. The court then asked, "Is the record 
complete?" (R. 240 at 17). The only additional information 
proffered was with respect to whether there was a parole hold on 
defendant issued by the State of Virginia (R. 240 at 17-18). 
Due to a dispute between defense counsel and the 
prosecutor about the precise agreement under which the 
conditional plea was entered, a hearing was held on November 17, 
1989 (R. 245). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled 
that defendant was limited to an appeal on the "sole issue" of 
whether the denial of his right to a preliminary hearing within 
ten days was violated unreasonably and without "good cause" (R. 
273-74). 
Defendant now claims, despite the trial court's ruling, 
that he is entitled to appeal the issues of whether lack of a 
speedy trial and cumulative delay entitle him to reversal and 
dismissal of the charges. In light of the trial court's ruling 
and because defendant never sought to withdraw his plea, those 
issues are not properly before the Court. And even assuming this 
Court reaches the merits of his claims, defendant is not entitled 
to relief. 
First, the record simply does not support defendant's 
claims. In Point III of defendant's brief, he has failed to 
provide a si ng] e ci tation to tl le record 1: ,o support h i s claims. 
tl ie statement of facts. However , many assertions I i i his brief at 
f: liBt 3es 26-28 are simp 3 y not supportab] e For thI s r e a s o n a 1 oi ie , 
Ihi it s argument roust fa :il 1 S e e 1 J t: .al I R I" i j: f • I 2 1(a) ( 9) ; State v. 
03 moE 73 2 P 2d 287 (U1 ah 1986); State v. Bingham, 684 P•2d 42 
(Utah 1984) 
Oi :it October 6 , 3 9138, defendant was bound over to the 
iistrict cour: * •• ** Defendant was 
*•• • . • .* - «h t v. ^eftriise counsel 
expresse : e-ti • h* ^.Huf- assignment „*_ ihe da^e 
The transcript of tl ie I: learii ig oi :i O c t o b e r " " «•««« -;
 s 
not I ncl uded J n the record; however, oi : tl lat date, Judge Rokich 
for reassignment J udge Uno was subsequent3 y assigned (R 23 ) 
Defendant was arraigned before Judge I Ji 10 on December 
] 2 ] 988 He p3 eaded not gi li ] ty and tri a3 \ ra.s scheduled for 
February 3 i 11 I a pretria1 scheduled for January 2 7
 r 3 9 8 9 (R 
??| Because Judqp Uno was presiding over a capital homicide 
I i i ii I „ I. hi1 pi*.1! i ial w<!,y con! iniied to Mri I'I, In I iml I hi : > 1 was 
continued to March 7 ,("[ , 2"ji), 
Defense counsel f 
11 "J , I  lHil'J I h 'III I III Ml I ' i i , ,
 4 „ o ~* « - o h e d g e d 
l„o be heard "larch 1 lr but were cont inued on motion of the 
l i l ' f l M l M l l II "III I III . " I I I ||i . 
On March 14, the court was informed that only one 
motion needed to be ruled upon, which was a part of the speedy 
trial motion that addressed the issue of the "ten-day rule" in 
Rule 7(7), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (R. 240 at 3). 
Nevertheless, the court ruled on and denied all motions, 
including defendant's claim that the "ten-day rule" was violated 
(R. 240 at 4-5). Defendant then pleaded guilty pursuant to a 
plea bargain which allowed him to plead guilty to reduced charges 
(from aggravated robbery, to robbery in counts 1-3) and to 
dismissal of count 4, being an habitual criminal (see R. 240). 
The plea was a conditional plea in which defendant reserved the 
right to appeal the "ten-day rule" issue (R. 240 at 3-4, 12-18). 
Defendant was scheduled for sentencing and waived the 
requirement that the sentencing be held within thirty days (R. 
240 at 11). Sentencing was scheduled for April 17 (R. 240 at 
11). The minute entry reflects that defendant was not 
transported from the jail on that day and the matter was 
continued, on motion of defense counsel, to April 24 (R. 216). 
Defendant was sentenced on April 24 to three terms of one to 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, with two counts to run 
consecutively (R. 239 at 10). He was given credit for the time 
he had served in jail since his initial incarceration (R. 239 at 
10). Thus, any prejudgment time spent in jail would be deducted 
from his prison sentence. 
In Barker v. Winqo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the United 
States Supreme Court established a test for determining whether a 
defendant's right to a speedy trial has been denied. The 
11 1 roach i s s u b j e c t t o a b a l a n c i n g t e s t in winch t h e con; : . * - •" 
IK it In I he del IMKIIUII II'I III I | «i i HMI I HI I i MI I I 'XIIIII in*1 I Id i I 
l(»rs t o b«» c o n s i d e r e d i n c l u d e t h e l e n g t h of t h e d e l a y , t h e 
in 4 ii 1 ; * - -- - > *he d^f<jnd*n* ' s a s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t , w..~ 
t I 11 (J | M'| " , 
.-* -tated that different weights should be 
assigned *' different ^**= ^ *'*r delay. 
A ueliberate attempt to delay the trial in 
order to hamper the defense should be weighed 
more heavily against the government. A n tor e 
neutral reason such as negligence or 
overcrowded courts should be weighed less 
heavily but nevertheless should be considered 
since the ultimate responsibility for such 
circumstances must rest with the government 
rather than with the defendant. Final ly, a 
valid reason, such as a missing witness, 
should serve to justify appropriate delay. 
Id. "rm<ri- state : m a t the prejudice pi T.U the 
test requires * -*xar : r:a t i.. j ,, - , -lterest^ :re speedy trial 
preven' i.ny »,h^tssivt re-i, t incarceration, reducinu the 
a n x i e n a \ i r,er * accused, and limiting *** possibility 
t h a t * ^+~+' ~, i I J U I : , *•- - . ?•>[*rf f . j i '> - > * - 1 " ' , f j t W H t > 
m m - * and trial . d n - ••• compel the conclusion that, the 
Beginning ii i State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 1026 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) , 
the I Jt ah Supreme Court held that the Bark er standard would be 
a p p J :i e • :::i :li i i 1 ill e i t c • e, 11 i s a n a 1 y s i s i s II:) i e a m e u n d e r 
either the United States or Utah Constitutions, State v. Banner, 
717 P.2d 1325, 1328 n.3 (Utah 1986). 
In Banner, the defendant went to trial one year after 
his initial arrest. The Court noted that the delay was due in 
part to the defendant's own actions. Part of the delay was the 
result of the time it takes to calendar a trial, which was fifty-
three days for the first setting and fifty-one days for the 
second setting. -These periods of time are necessary in a 
jurisdiction such as this and not at all unreasonable." Iji* at 
1330. 
The Court found that a seven-month delay between arrest 
and submission of the case to a judge, and an eighteen-month 
delay in obtaining a decision was not unreasonable in State v. 
Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986). The Court again noted the 
normal problems with trial scheduling and found that the 
defendant had not been prejudiced by the delay. j[d. at 1385-86. 
In State v. Miller, 747 P.2d 440 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
this Court analyzed a speedy trial claim under the Barker 
standard. When balancing the four factors, this Court found that 
defendant's incarceration for 152 days between arrest and trial 
did not constitute a denial of his right to a speedy trial. Part 
of the delay was attributable to the defendant; he did little to 
assert his right to a speedy trial, and aside from being 
incarcerated for a substantial period of time, he was not 
prejudiced by the delay. 
The first prong of the Barker test requires an 
examination of the length of the delay. In the present case, six 
months elapsed between the time defendant was booked into the 
Salt Lake County Jail and the date on which he pleaded guilty. 
P * "• r^h the length of the delay was not minimal, neither was i t 
unusut "in i kali J f . 
The r e a s o n for t h e d e l a y , time second Barker fa t 
more d i f f i c u l t t u a n a l y ? ^ <1n< tn the Ian i i * " : -
xeu'CM i. rh r i ' i " ,M "i the delay between 11 .
 t.t . . . ^i^sentment 
0: : j-re-. iminary hearing was f . U y p x , , a • 
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c & arraignment wi occasioned by Judge Rokich recusing 
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counsel knf*- r * - • * * 
was i i i :i 1 
recusal, endant was i 
assioi . UQ t ht- ^a?1 judge. The record 
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Defendant filed si x motions on February ]( , ,19Rq (P 
266^ i-^ * & w^a u u n t i n u e d t o a 1 11 iw I IIIIC I liiviii def (Minli 
rd does not reflect tl le r eason that the case was not 
itiously brought to Judge Uno's attention for 
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si
 " which under these circumstances does not just I fy relief, 
.. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah 1989)." 
motions (R. 266). The hearing on the motions was set March 14 by 
stipulation of both counsel (R., 266). On March 14, defendant 
entered his pleas of guilty (R. 240). 
Defendant waived the 30-day maximum time by which 
sentence should be imposed and sentencing was scheduled for April 
17 (R. 240 at 11). The sentencing was continued only once, 
because defendant was not transferred to court from the jail, to 
April 24 (R. 216). 
Many of the continuances were occasioned by or 
acquiesced in by defendant. Some others were attributable to 
routine calendaring delays. Defendant agrees that none of the 
delays in the district court were attributable to the State and 
prosecutor (R. 267). Under these circumstances, the reasons for 
the delays were not unreasonable. 
The third Barker factor is whether defendant asserted 
his right to a speedy trial. Defendant claimed a right to a 
timely preliminary hearing in circuit court but did not assert 
his right to a speedy trial in the district court until February 
15 or 16, 1989, when he filed a motion claiming a denial of the 
right. Defendant made efforts to expedite the process along the 
course of events (e.g., the November 29, 1988, letter to Judge 
Uno (R. 246)) but perhaps could have been more aggressive in 
demanding that the process move more expeditiously. 
Nevertheless, this failure is understandable given the normal 
pace of the process in third district court. 
The final Barker factor is a determination of whether a 
defendant has been prejudiced as a result of the denial of a 
spee ,., i : ~c . d e i e m - :i in , c ar c e i a Let ill! 
f o r * *r * • - t a i M f i r r t * * .me *- * .i>t c aused a n x i e t y 
1 11 1 IB ft B p p f t 11 j 
3 Barker analysis, j*ieiaad, .,«.- shuwe«- utterly in prejudice as 
ppjlt .e df . i » i.*t claimed that his defense was 
III in"1! i," I " I ' l l I! I l l 1 I III III m l III 
an «j*d,.Laye While period incarceration was 
> - * < = * r * unusual, defendant received the 
',i i 'in t. i e i 1 i I 
sentencing for all prejudgmen incarceration he had endured -
239 a u ii 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant ' s el ai in t l :i a t he was den ied a t i ineJ y 
g u :i Il ty t :: 
three counts of robbery should stand. For the foregoing reasons, 
as we] ] as any additioriaJ reasons advanced at oral argument, tl ie 
S t • :ii I: € • :: f I I I: a 1 • ; Il 1 i s C : ::i e I: e i :i d a :i :i I: • s 
convi ctions. 
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arraignment at the Circuit Court and hearing of the -- I 
quess the first hearing and the setting up of the preliminary 
hearing exceeded the ten-day rule and --
MR. W A L S H : That is correct, J u d g e , and there 
is no question but that happened. 
THE COURT: Based on what the Court is aware 
of and what's been filed with the Court, the Court is of the 
opinion that the ten-day rule applies to situations where it 
can be done but for good cause showing that it can exceed 
those ten days. 
So, the Court is goina to deny that notion 
MR. D E L A N D : Your Honor, I would like to add, 
we have prepared -- I have been over a number of times with 
Mr. Brassell the rights he has that pertains to trial and the 
rights he will be w a i v i n a . I'm sure we can go over them 
again briefly. I have not yet had him sign the form. 
THE COURT: Mr. B r a s s e l l , you are not under 
the influence of any a l c o h o l , drug or any medication at this 
time? 
THE D E F E N D A N T : N o , sir. 
THE COURT: And you understand what you are 
doing in changing your plea? 
THE D E F E N D A N T : Y e s , sir. 
THE C O U R T : And there have been no threats or 
promises made to you to change your plea, except what's been 
represented to the Court by your attorney in the Statement of 
the Defendant and what's been represented to the Court orally 
at this time? 
THE DEFENDANT: That's right. 
THE COURT: You are changing your plea 
voluntarily of your own free will? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
MR. DELAND: I was not aware -- I was filling 
out the affidavit and I did not hear the representation as to 
the conditional plea, other than what the condition w a s . 
But as to the a p p e a l , I know Mr. Walsh represented there 
would be three seconds and the count of habitual criminal 
would be dismissed. Is that it? 
MR. WALSH: We haven't put the plea yet on 
the record. 
MR. DELAND: Oh, okay. 
THE COURT: And I guess you have to recite that 
in the presence of your client for the record so that we will 
know exactly what the agreement is and that he understands it 
and agrees to it. 
MR. DELAND: As it stands now, Mr. Brassell is 
charged with four c o u n t s , the first three being armed or 
aggravated robbery, a felony of the first d e g r e e , and fourth 
count of being a habitual c r i m i n a l . 
And as a result of plea b a r g a i n , Mr. 
Brassell would enter pleas to Counts 1, 2 and 3 amended to 
simple robbery, a second degree felony. And the fourth 
count, habitual criminal, would be there would be a Motion 
to dismiss that from the State upon acceptance of the other 
three pleas, second degree felonies; is that right? 
MR. WALSH: That is correct, Judge. 
THE COURT: If you can raise your right hand. 
Let me ask you first, is that the 
understanding that you have as far as this plea bargain is 
concerned? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And you agree to that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: If you can raise your right hand 
and be sworn. 
(Whereupon, the defendant was sworn by the 
Clerk of the Court. ) 
This information is to be amended and it 
will be the simple robbery, is that? 
MR, DELAND: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Just robbery, second degree? 
MR. DELAND: Yes. 
So it would excise the use of firearm 
or facsimile in the facts statement. 



























firearm or facsimile of firearm"? 
MR. DELAND: That's correct. 
I think the Chapter -- the Section is 
also 301, rather than 302. 
THE COURT: Has he executed that document? 
MR. DELAND: He has not, Your Honor. He can 
do that in the presence of the Court. 
THE COURT: If he can sign that. 
(Defendant signs document.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Brassell , do you understand that 
for a second degree felony, you may be punished by being 
sentenced to the Utah State Penitentiary for a period from one 
to fifteen years? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: That you may be fined up to $10,000 
plus 25% surcharge? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And this may be for each count, 
do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: The three counts. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And that each of these counts, 
jthe maximum may be imposed; do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And that they may run consecutive; 
do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: The elements of this are: That 
you took property from another person intentionally and 
unlawfully by force or fear; is that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You are 34 years of age? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And you have completed the 11th 
grade? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You read and understand the English 
language? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And you have had an opportunity to 
read this Statement of Defendant that you just signed? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And your attorney has explained to 
you the legal rights that you will be waiving in the event 
you should change your plea? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And you understand those legal 
rights that you will be waiving? 


























THE COURT: Do you have any questions? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you prepared at this time to 
enter a plea to Count I, Robbery, a Second Degree Felony, at 
181 East 6100 South in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or 
about March 19, 1986, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Section 301, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: How do you wish to plead to that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: To Count II, Robbery, a Second 
Degree Felony, at 181 East. 6100 South, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on or about March 19, 1986, in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 301, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended; how do you wish to plead to that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: To Count III, Robbery, a Second 
Degree Felony, at 181 East, 6100 South, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on or about March 19, 1986, in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 301, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended; how do you wish to Plead to that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Based on your response to the 
Court's inquiries, the Court is of the opinion that you are 



























and that you understand what you are doing and you are doing 
it voluntarily of your own free will and that there has been 
no threats or promises made to you to change your plea, 
except what's been represented to the Court by your attorney 
and the County Attorney's Office. 
Waive time for sentencing? 
MR, DELAND: Your Honor, no, I think that under 
the circumstances that we would want a pre-sentence report. 
There were some negotiations my client wished to enter into 
land was rejected. He's accepted this with full knowledge of 
i 
11 h a t and he believes it might be in his best interest here. 
For one thing, the information that might 
Ibe available to the Court on the habitual criminal charge is 
l 
i 
(inaccurate. We would waive the maximum time but not the 
minimum. 
THE COURT: He will be referred over to Adult 
Probation and Parole for a pre-sentence report. Sentencing 
will be in 30 days. 
THE CLERK: It will be April 17 at 2:00. 
MR. DELAND: I have a 1:30 hearing before the 
Magistrate in Federal Court. 
THE CLERK: We'll probably have enough on our 
calendar we can put you at the end. 
MR. DELAND: Okay. 



























record here? Can we do that? 
And I also need to move to dismiss Count IV 
and I would so m o v e . 
THE COURT: All right. Any objections? 
MR. DELAND: No. 
THE COURT: Count IV will be dismissed on the 
motion of the State. 
MR. WALSH: I think we can agree and put it on 
the record h e r e , which would obviate the necessity of going 
back to --
MR. DELAND: There's a rule about proffering 
on evidentiary m a t t e r s , but I don't have any objection on the 
part of the agreement. We can supplement the record here 
as far as we can, but we would also need to obtain transcripts 
of any actual hearings before any Circuit Court judges before 
iwe go to this motion. And it would be my responsibility to 
get those to supplement the record further on a p p e a l . 
j MR. WALSH: Okay. Can we just have the benefit 
jof the record to see what our record reflects with respect to 
[that one issue. And I might i n d i c a t e , J u d g e , for the record, 
i 
that part of our reasoning for entering into this negotiation 
is that, in light of the conditional plea, there will be only 
one issue raised on a p p e a l ; and that was the delay with respect 
to the preliminary hearing. Nothing else; there would be no 



























our plea bargain here, part of the essence of the bargain. 
Our file, J u d g e , shows that with respect 
to the original arraignment, Mr. Brassell was arraigned 
originally before Judge Grant on September 12 of 1988. It was 
represented to our office at that time that Mr. Leroy Johnson, 
a local attorney, would be representing Mr. Brassell here. 
And roll call was set at that time for September 20 at 9:30 
before Judge Fuchs, and with a preliminary hearing date of 
September 22 at 2:00. And I don't know who the judge would 
have been on that. 
On the 20th of September of 1988 at 9:30, 
Scott Reed of our office appeared before Judge Fuchs at the 
roll call. Mr. Deland, according to my file, was not present 
due to illness. I don't have personal k n o w l e d g e , since I was 
not present. The roll call was then continued to the 22nd to 
accommodate Mr. Deland's being present and the preliminary 
hearing -- for another roll call on the 22nd at 9:30 before 
Judge Gowans. 
We then appeared, I believe Mr. Deland --
I don't remember if M r s . Boyden was there present, but we had 
a discussion at that time, inasmuch as we had received a 
preliminary hearinq date, we had subpoenaed our witnesses to 
appear, one of whom was Eugene Garrett, who when we had 
subpoenaed him we learned in the intervening years since the 



























unable to attend the preliminary hearing. And so, because 
we didn't know even if we could get him at that time, 
that was part of the reason why we needed a little bit more 
of an extension to actually have a preliminary hearing. 
Also involved in that was the fact that 
Mr. Deland had requested a lineup that his client would appear 
in so we could see whether or not Mr. Garrett, along with the 
three victims of the robbery, would be able to identify him --
when I say "him", I mean Mr. Brassell. 
That was coupled with two other facts. 
Judge Gowans, and I believe anybody else in the Circuit Court 
who might have been available to hear the preliminary hearing, 
had already made arrangements to attend a judicial conference. 
And so, for that next week, as my recollection serves me, he 
and anybody else was unavailable to hear the preliminary 
hearing date. 
And also as a part of that, Mr. Deland 
had been subpoenaed to appear in a Federal trial down in 
Arizona and didn't think that he could be there, as I recall. 
Maybe this is wrong on --
MR. DELAND: I can correct that when you are 
done. 
MR. WALSH: That he was unavailable for an 
earlier preliminary hearing setting. 
As a result of that, Judge Gowans found 
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